







EUI Working Papers 
ECO 2008/39 
Labor-Market Volatility in the Search-and- 
Matching Model: The Role of  
Investment-Specific Technology Shocks 




Labor-Market Volatility in the Search-and-Matching Model: 




EUI Working Paper ECO  2008/39
   
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional 
reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent 
of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the 
author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
The author(s)/editor(s) should inform the Economics Department of the EUI if the paper is to 



























© 2008 Renato Faccini and Salvador Ortigueira 
Printed in Italy  
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




http://cadmus.eui.eu/ Labor-Market Volatility in the Search-and-Matching Model: The







Shocks to investment-speci¯c technology have been identi¯ed as a main source of U.S.
aggregate output volatility. In this paper we assess the contribution of these shocks to the
volatility of labor market variables, namely, unemployment, vacancies, tightness and the job-
¯nding rate. Thus, our paper contributes to a recent body of literature assessing the ability
of the search-and-matching model to account for the large volatility observed in labor market
variables. To this aim, we solve a neoclassical economy with search and matching in the labor
market, where neutral and investment-speci¯c technologies are subject to shocks. The three
key features of our model economy are: i) Firms are large, in the sense that they employ many
workers. ii) Adjusting capital and labor is costly. iii) Wages are the outcome of an intra-¯rm
Nash-bargaining problem between the ¯rm and its workers. In our calibrated economy, we ¯nd
that shocks to investment-speci¯c technology explain 40 percent of the observed volatility in
U.S. labor productivity. Moreover, these shocks generate relative volatilities in vacancies and
the workers' job ¯nding rate which match those observed in U.S. data. Relative volatilities
in unemployment and labor market tightness are 55 and 75 percent of their empirical values,
respectively.
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11 Introduction
In the last few years, a large and active literature has emerged around the unemployment
volatility puzzle. More precisely, this literature assesses the extent to which the search-and-
matching model with Nash wage bargaining can account for the following three observations: 1)
large °uctuations in labor market variables relative to the °uctuations of labor productivity; 2)
low sensitivity of unemployment with respect to unemployment bene¯ts, and 3) a high correlation
between wages and productivity in new matches.
Shimer (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2008) have shown that the textbook version of the
Mortensen-Pissarides model is unable to generate the observed relative °uctuations in labor
market variables in response to shocks to labor productivity. The failure of the model is to be
found in the surplus' sharing rule implied by Nash bargaining. That is, wages absorb most of
the increases in labor productivity, thus reducing the procyclicality of the ¯rm's share of the
surplus and so the incentive for vacancy creation. Costain and Reiter (2008) and Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) note that a di®erent calibration of the model can generate large °uctuations
in labor market variables. Indeed, with high, acyclical non-market returns to workers and low
workers' bargaining power, wages become relatively rigid and the ¯rm's share of surplus more
procyclical, restoring the ¯rm's incentives to create vacancies. However, as pointed out by Costain
and Reiter (2008) and by Pissarides (2008), this calibration strategy implies a counterfactually
high sensitivity of unemployment to non-market returns. A di®erent line of research has advocated
for the replacement of continuous Nash wage bargaining by some stickier sharing rule. Gertler
and Trigari (2007), among others, propose wage stickiness µ a la Calvo. Hall (2005) argues in favor
of e±cient wage stickiness where wages do not react, or only partially, to high-frequency changes
in labor productivity.1 Objections to models with sticky wages have been raised by Pissarides
(2008) and Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens (2008) by arguing that they fail to generate the high
correlation between wages and productivity observed in new matches.
In this paper, we retain the assumption of continuous Nash renegotiation of wages and con-
tribute to this literature by endogenizing labor productivity to the ¯rm's investment and hiring
policy. With this aim, we remove the assumption of employer-worker pairs producing without
capital and assume instead the standard neoclassical ¯rm that employs many workers and owns
capital.2 We then explore the ability of the model to amplify the volatility of labor market vari-
ables after shocks to both neutral and investment-speci¯c technology. We model this latter type
of technology as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997, 2000) which allows us to calibrate
1Di®erent sources of wage rigidity in the search-and-matching model have been studied e.g. by Hall and Milgrom
(2008), Kennan (2006), Menzio (2005), Moen and Rosen (2006) and Rudanko (2008).
2For early work on the search-and-matching model with large ¯rms see Andolfato (1996) and Merz (1995).
2investment-speci¯c technology shocks using the cyclical component of the relative price of new
capital goods. In our model economy, job separations within the ¯rm occur exogenously and
capital depreciates at a constant rate. To hire workers the ¯rm must open vacancies and then
negotiate wages for new and continuing workers. Adjusting the level of capital and employment is
costly and these costs are jointly determined by investment and hiring rates. An important con-
sequence of the large ¯rm assumption is the so-called intra-¯rm bargaining, that is, the fact that
the ¯rm anticipates the wage e®ects of its hiring and investment policy.3 By virtue of intra-¯rm
bargaining, the wage function in our model becomes increasing in the level of neutral technology
and decreasing in investment-speci¯c technology.
In our calibrated economy, shocks to investment-speci¯c technology account for 40 percent
of the observed volatility in U.S. labor productivity. Moreover, these shocks generate relative
volatilities in vacancies and the workers' job ¯nding rate which match those observed in U.S.
data. Relative volatilities in unemployment and labor market tightness are 55 and 75 percent of
their empirical values, respectively. In other words, from this quantitative exercise we conclude
that 40% of the volatility in labor productivity explains 22% of the observed volatility in unem-
ployment, 40% of the volatility in vacancies, 30% of the volatility in tightness and 40% of the
volatility in the job ¯nding rate. These numbers are about one order of magnitude higher than
those obtained by Shimer (2005) within the textbook version of the Mortensen-Pissarides model.
The mechanism for ampli¯cation in our economy works through the costly adjustment of
capital and labor and its e®ect on the intra-¯rm bargained wage. There are two main forces
shaping the response of vacancies to investment-speci¯c technology shocks. In the ¯rst place,
the ¯rm needs to spread out the convex adjustment costs over time, which creates a tension
between investment and hiring leading to a contraction in hiring. The second force comes from
the compressing e®ect of these shocks on wages, which increases the procyclicality of the ¯rm's
share of the surplus with respect to these shocks and leads to an increase in hiring. We will
elaborate further on this in the main text of this paper.
The increased volatility in labor market variables in our model economy is not at the cost of a
counterfactually high sensitivity of unemployment to unemployment bene¯ts. Since we calibrate
the model to match a replacement rate of 45 percent, non-market returns are low compared
to returns from employment. In our benchmark economy, the semi-elasticity of unemployment
with respect to bene¯ts is slightly above one, which is in the lower bound of estimated values.
On the other hand, the correlation between wages and labor productivity in our economy with
investment-speci¯c technology shocks is 0:9, a value which is in line with the correlation estimated
3See Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b) for a general discussion of intra-¯rm bargaining. For studies of intra-¯rm
bargaining within the search-and-matching model see, e.g., Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), Krause and Lubik (2007)
and Rotemberg (2006).
3in new matches.
The way we introduce investment-speci¯c technological change in our model economy closely
follows the original idea of technology embedded in new investment goods, which the ¯rm can
acquire by devoting resources to investment. As in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997,
2000), we allow the ¯rm to continuously invest in new capital, in contrast to the Schumpeterian
view where only newly created ¯rms have access to new technologies, with all its implications
in terms of employment reallocation. In this regard, the mechanism we explore in this paper
to generate volatility in labor market variables after shocks to investment-speci¯c technology is
di®erent from the ones put forward recently by Reiter (2008), Hornstein, Krusell and Violante
(2007) and Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007). Reiter (2008) abstracts from capital and retains
the assumption of employer-worker pairs. This author models embodied technical change by
assuming that the exogenous process for labor productivity has a permanent match-speci¯c com-
ponent. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) introduce capital into the employer-worker pair
but assume that ¯rms in an existing match can never adjust their capital stock in response to a
change in the environment. In these two works, ampli¯cation in unemployment and vacancies is
at the cost of an excessive volatility in wages. Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) are interested
on the e®ects of neutral and investment-speci¯c technical change on job °ows, especially on job
destruction. They assume that while newly created jobs embody the most advanced technolo-
gies, existing jobs fail to upgrade their capital. They ¯nd that advances in investment-speci¯c
technology reduce job destruction.4
Finally, the work of Elsby and Michaels (2008) and Yashiv (2008) also use the assumption
of large ¯rms, but they abstract from capital and from investment-speci¯c technology. These
authors study labor market volatility by introducing idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out our search-and-
matching model with large ¯rms, we de¯ne the search equilibrium and derive the wage function
for the parameterized economy. In Section 3 we carry out our quantitative analysis and assess
the ampli¯cation of unemployment, vacancies, tightness and the job ¯nding rate after shocks
to neutral and investment-speci¯c technology. This Section also addresses the sensitivity of
unemployment to unemployment bene¯ts and Section 4 concludes.
4Other papers with investment-speci¯c technology shocks are Silva and Toledo (2007) and De Bock (2007).
These authors assume that the output produced by a job within the ¯rm is independent of the number of workers
in the ¯rm. Their setting does not generate ampli¯cation in labor market variables in response to investment-speci¯c
shocks.
42 The Model
2.1 The labor market
There is a measure one of identical, risk-neutral workers and an equal measure of ¯rms.
Unemployed workers search for jobs and ¯rms open vacancies in a frictional labor market. The
total number of matches per period, M, is given by an increasing, concave and homogeneous-of-
degree-one matching function,
M = M(V;1 ¡ N);
where V denotes the total number of vacancies created by all ¯rms and 1 ¡ N is the number of
unemployed workers.
The vacancy matching rate, ¹, is thus given by M=V , and the job-¯nding rate of an unem-
ployed worker is M=(1 ¡ N) = µ¹, where µ denotes labor market tightness V=(1 ¡ N).
2.2 Firms
The production sector is described by a measure one of value-maximizing ¯rms facing an
in¯nite time horizon. Firms produce an identical, aggregate good with a production technology
given by F(z;k;n), where k denotes capital, n is the ¯rm's level of employment and z is the
level of neutral technology. Function F is assumed to be increasing, jointly concave and linearly
homogeneous in capital and labor. Firms own the capital stock and thus both capital and labor
are predetermined variables.
In a given period, the ¯rm loses employment at the exogenous, stochastic rate ¸, whose
evolution is speci¯ed below, and it opens vacancies to hire new workers. Newly hired workers
start producing in the next period. Firms expect vacancies to be matched with workers at the
rate ¹(S), where S denotes the vector of aggregate state variables [we will use \small" s to denote
the vector of ¯rm-level state variables]. The cost to the ¯rm of advertising v vacancies is given
by the convex function C(v). The evolution of employment within the ¯rm is given by,
n0 = ¹(S)v + (1 ¡ ¸)n: (2.1)
The stock of capital depreciates at the constant rate ±. The assumption of investment-speci¯c
technical change implies that one unit of the aggregate good invested in capital increases its stock
by q units. That is, the evolution of capital is,
k0 = iq + (1 ¡ ±)k; (2.2)
5where i denotes gross investment. Thus, factor q represents the level of investment-speci¯c tech-
nology, which is assumed to follow an exogenous, stochastic process. This particular modeling
was ¯rst used by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997, 2000) in order to assess the role of
investment-speci¯c technical change in generating both postwar U.S. growth and U.S. aggregate
°uctuations. Since 1=q is the relative price of capital, we will use de-trended price series to derive
the volatility and persistence of the technology process q.
Accommodating ¹v new workers and iq units of new capital within the ¯rm is costly. We
assume that adjustment costs of labor and capital interact and represent total adjustment costs
by the function H(v;i;s;S), where s = (z;q;¸;k;n) and S = (z;q;¸;K;N) are the vectors of
individual and aggregate state variables, respectively. Function H is convex with Hv > 0, Hi > 0,
Hk < 0 and Hn < 0, for k > 0 and n > 0. The assumption of interrelation between labor and
capital adjustment costs implies that Hkn 6= 0. We will provide evidence supporting assumption
below.
The ¯rm's objective is the maximization of the present value of cash °ows. First, the ¯rm
opens vacancies and invests in capital. Next, wages for new hires and existing workers are
negotiated.5 The standard Nash-bargaining solution is assumed. Since the ¯rm is large |i.e. it
employs a mass of workers| negotiated wages will depend on the ¯rm's hiring and investment
policy. Intra-¯rm bargaining implies that the ¯rm anticipates the wage e®ects of its policy. Thus,
if we denote by !(v;i;s;S) the wage function that solves the wage bargaining problem of a ¯rm
that opened v vacancies and invested i in new capital, at individual and aggregate states s and




F(z;k;n) ¡ !(v;i;s;S)n ¡ i ¡ C(v) ¡ H(v;i;s;S) + ¯ E[¦(s0;S0)jz;q;¸]
o
s:t:
equations (2:1) and (2:2)
lnz0 = ½z lnz + ²z (2.3)
lnq0 = ½q lnq + ²q (2.4)
ln¸0 = (1 ¡ ½¸)ln ^ ¸ + ½¸ ln¸ + ²¸ (2.5)
(²z;²q;²¸)T » N(0;D); where D is a diagonal matrix, (2.6)
where ¦(s;S) is the value of the ¯rm and where aggregate state variables are expected to evolve
according to some function of the current levels. The ¯rm discounts future cash °ows at the
rate ¯, which is the same rate risk-neutral workers use to discount income. Parameters ½z and
½q denote persistence of the neutral and investment-speci¯c technology processes, respectively;
5This timing for investment is not relevant for our results. We carried out the analysis assuming that investment
is decided upon simultaneously with wage negotiations and found no signi¯cant di®erences.
6^ ¸ and ½¸ denote the average and the persistence of the job separation rate, respectively. Vector
(²z;²q;²¸)T denotes the respective innovations with variance matrix D.
It should be noted that the concavity of the production function and the convexity of the
adjustment cost and vacancy cost functions do not guarantee the concavity of the ¯rm's maxi-
mization problem. Since the ¯rm foresees the wage function that will solve the Nash-bargaining
problem with the workers, the maximization problem may be non-concave. We will argue below
that in our benchmark economy ¯rst-order conditions are necessary and su±cient.
The ¯rst-order condition to vacancies can be written as,
!vn + Cv + Hv = ¹¯ E¦0
n; (2.7)
where function arguments have been omitted as there is no risk of ambiguity. !v denotes the
derivative of !(v;i;s;S) with respect to vacancies; Cv is the derivative of the vacancy cost func-
tion; Hv is the derivate of the adjustment cost function with respect to v, and ¦0
n is the derivative
of the value function with respect to employment, evaluated at next-period values. The term !vn
on the left-hand side of (2:7) is a consequence of the assumption of large ¯rms conducting intra-
¯rm bargaining. The e®ect of vacancies on wages, via adjustment costs, is internalized by the
¯rm when opening vacancies. That is, the ¯rm takes into account the change in total wage costs,
!vn, when determining its hiring policy.
The ¯rst-order condition to investment is given by,
!in + 1 + Hi = q¯ E¦0
k: (2.8)
As with vacancies, the ¯rm also weighs the e®ect of investment on total wage costs, !in, when
setting the level of investment. From the envelope condition, the value of capital for the ¯rm,
¦k, satis¯es the following non-arbitrage condition,
¦k = Fk ¡ !kn ¡ Hk + (1 ¡ ±)¯ E¦0
k; (2.9)
which also embeds the e®ect of capital on the cost of labor.
Finally, the net value of employment for the ¯rm, J ´ ¦n, must satisfy the following non-
arbitrage condition,
J = Fn ¡ !nn ¡ ! ¡ Hn + (1 ¡ ¸)¯ EJ0; (2.10)
where Fn is the marginal productivity of labor and !nn captures the e®ect of employment on the
cost of labor.
72.3 Workers
Workers are risk-neutral and discount future consumption of the aggregate good at the rate
¯. A worker earns a wage, !, if employed and receives income, b, if unemployed (this income
is interpreted as unemployment bene¯ts, home production or, more generally, as the income
value of leisure). The change in employment status depends on job creation and job destruction.
Each period, ¸n employed workers lose their job and µ¹u of the unemployed are matched with a
vacancy. When negotiating wages, workers take matching probabilities as given. Thus, denoting
by W the worker's net value of employment at the ¯rm, the following non-arbitrage condition
must hold,
W = ! ¡ b + ¯ E
h
(1 ¡ ¸)W0 ¡ µ¹ ^ W0
i
; (2.11)
where ^ W0 is the expected value of employment outside the ¯rm in the following period. (From
our assumption of identical ¯rms it follows that W0 = ^ W0 in equilibrium.)
2.4 Wage bargaining
A ¯rm negotiates wages with each of its workers. The Nash-bargaining solution maximizes
the weighted product of the worker's and the ¯rm's value of employment. We use ° to denote





The ¯rst-order condition to this maximization problem yields the standard sharing rule,
(1 ¡ °)W = °J: (2.13)
Combining the equation above with (2.7), (2.10) and (2:11), and using the assumption of contin-
uous wage renegotiation, we obtain
!(v;i;s;S) = °
h
Fn(z;k;n) ¡ !n(v;i;s;S)n ¡ Hn(v;i;s;S)
i
+ (1 ¡ °)
h
b + µ¹¯E ^ W0
i
: (2.14)
Equation (2.14) is a di®erential equation in the unknown wage function !(v;i;s;S). This
equation embeds two important departures from the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model, where
the production side is made up of employer-worker pairs (small ¯rms) without capital. In our
setting, the ¯rm's °ow value of the match is not solely pinned down by the marginal productivity
of the worker. Here, the ¯rm also takes into account the value of the worker's contribution to
decreasing wages (the second term within the ¯rst brackets) as well as total adjustment costs
(the third term within ¯rst brackets). Since new hires, ¹v, and new capital, iq, interact in
the determination of total adjustment costs, the wage function also depends on the level of
investment-speci¯c technology q.
82.5 Equilibrium
A recursive search equilibrium with intra-¯rm bargaining can be loosely de¯ned by
decisions rules for vacancies and investment, a wage function !(v;i;s;S), a vacancy matching
rate ¹(S), labor market tightness µ(S), value functions and laws of motion for aggregate state
variables such that:
i) Decision rules for vacancies and investment solve the ¯rm's maximization problem, given
the wage function, the vacancy matching rate and the laws of motion for aggregate variables.
ii) The wage function is the solution to the Nash-bargaining problem (2:14).
iii) Matching rates are given by the matching function evaluated at V = v and N = n.
iv) Laws of motion for the aggregate states are consistent with individual behavior.
v) Value functions solve the ¯rms' and workers' maximization problems.
2.6 The Wage Function in the Parameterized Economy
Functional forms for production, matching, adjustment costs and vacancy creation costs are
now established. All of our functional forms are standard.
The production technology of the representative ¯rm is represented by a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion with constant returns to scale in capital and labor,
F (z;k;n) = zAk®n1¡®; (2.15)
where A > 0 and 0 · ® · 1 are parameters.
The matching technology is represented by a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function,
which is the standard functional form in the literature of frictional labor markets,
M(V;1 ¡ N) = MV 1¡´(1 ¡ N)´; (2.16)
where M > 0 is the matching-e±ciency parameter and 0 · ´ · 1 is the elasticitiy of matches
with respect to unemployment.
The cost of adjusting labor and capital is represented by the following quadratic adjustment
cost function,





for n > 0 and k > 0 (2.17)
9and
H(¹v;iq;n;k) = 0 for n = 0 or k = 0; (2.18)
where a1 > 0 and a2 > 0 are parameters. This adjustment cost function is a particular case of one
recently estimated by Merz and Yashiv (2007). As explained above, an important feature of this
function is the interaction between employment and investment rates in the determination of total
adjustment costs, which is captured by the last term in equation (2:17). Merz and Yashiv (2007)
¯nd that this interaction term is key in accounting for the market value of U.S. ¯rms. Further
support for this interaction can be found in the empirical literature on employment and capital
adjustment decisions [see, i.e., Sakellaris (2004), Letterie, Pfann and Polder (2004) and Contreras
(2006a, 2006b).] For example, Contreras (2006a) ¯nds, using data from the Colombian Annual
Census of Manufacturing, that it is more costly for the ¯rm to adjust capital and employment at
the same time rather than sequently. Indirect evidence can also be found in the work of Letterie,
Pfann and Polder (2004) who analyze data on Dutch plants in the manufacturing sector and ¯nd
that only 20% of the positive employment spikes occur in the same period as an investment spike.
We show in this paper that the interaction between labor and capital in the adjustment cost
function is also key to generate volatility in labor market variables.
Finally, the cost of opening vacancies is assumed to be linear in the number of vacancies,
C(v) = cv, where c > 0 is a parameter.
For this parameterization, the wage function that solves the Nash-bargaining problem |
di®erential equation (2:14)| can be found analytically. The next proposition presents the general
solution to the di®erential equation.
Proposition: The general solution to the di®erential equation characterizing the symmetric
Nash-bargaining problem is given by,














b + µ¹¯E ^ W0
i
; (2.19)
where Ã is an arbitrary constant.
Proof: See the Appendix.
We will impose Ã = 0 to focus our attention on the particular solution yielding a wage bill
equal to zero at n = 0. Further, we will also make sure that the bargaining set is non-empty and
wages are bounded along the equilibrium path of our baseline economy. The last term within
brackets in equation (2:19) is the worker's value of unemployment which, in equilibrium, is given
by b+µ[!vn+Cv +Hv]. It should be noted that all the derivatives of the wage function assume
the worker's reservation value as given and independent of ¯rm-level variables.
It is apparent from a simple inspection of the wage function in (2:19) that the levels of neutral
10and investment-speci¯c technology a®ect wages di®erently. On one hand, neutral technology, z,
has a positive, direct e®ect on wages, which leads to a perfect, positive correlation between labor
productivity and wages. As discussed in Shimer (2005), it is the perfect correlation between
productivity and wages generated by the Mortensen-Pissarides model that lies at the heart of
its failure to account for the observed volatilities in labor market variables. On the other hand,
investment-speci¯c technology, q, enters with a negative sign in the wage function (notice that the
¯rm's level of employment is bounded above by one, and, therefore, ln(n) is a negative number).
Thus, investment-speci¯c technology shocks are bound to reduce the contemporaneous correlation
between labor productivity and wages and, as a consequence, to generate ampli¯cation in labor
market °uctuations.
The concavity of the ¯rm's maximization problem for the parameterized economy can now
be assessed. Since the ¯rm foresees the wage function (2:19) when choosing its hiring and invest-
ment policy, it is straightforward to show that the return function F(z;k;n)¡!(v;i;s;S)n¡i¡
C(v) ¡ H(v;i;s;S) is concave in the controls but not in the state variables. Indeed, the term
¡!(v;i;s;S)n is convex in n. This class of dynamic maximization problems have been studied
in Skiba (1978) and Ladr¶ on-de-Guevara, Ortigueira and Santos (1999), and conditions for opti-
mality have been established. In short, if parameter values are such that there exists a unique,
interior, saddle-path stable, steady-state equilibrium with real roots, then ¯rst-order conditions
are necessary and su±cient. This is the condition we will check in our baseline economy below.
2.7 Parameter Values
We now assign values to all parameters of the model in order to assess the quantitative e®ects
of di®erent sources of volatility on labor market variables. Parameter values are set so that the
steady-state equilibrium of our baseline economy matches some key averages of the 1951-2003
U.S. economy.
A time period in our model is set to one month. Values of the constant in the production
function, A, and of the bargaining power parameter, °, are set arbitrarily. We normalize the
value of A to one, and set ° equal to 1=2. The assumption of symmetric bargaining is standard
in the literature. The rate of job separation at the steady-state equilibrium is set equal to 0:034,
which corresponds to the probability that a worker loses his job within an average month, as
estimated by Abowd and Zelner (1985). The elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment
is set at 0:6, which is the midpoint value of the range estimated by Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001). The value of the discount factor, ¯, is set to 0:995, which yields a monthly interest rate
of 0:5 percent. The depreciation rate of capital, ±, is 0:011 and the value of ® in the production
function is set at 0:3. The value chosen for ± yields a yearly rate of depreciation of the order of
1113 percent, which is the value for the depreciation rate of equipment capital in the U.S. economy.
Income during unemployment b, the match-e±ciency parameter M, the marginal cost of
vacancy creation c, and the two parameters in the adjustment cost function a1 and a2 are set so
that the steady-state equilibrium of the model yields: i) A vacancy-¯lling rate of 0:9 per month.
ii) Income during unemployment represents 45 percent of employment income. This replacement
rate is similar to the one chosen by Shimer (2005). iii) The total cost of adjusting capital and
labor represents 2:4 percent of output. This is the value estimated by Merz and Yashiv (2007).
iv) The sum of the marginal costs of adjusting capital and labor, i.e., Hik + Hvn, amounts to
3:5 percent of output, also as estimated by Merz and Yashiv (2007). v) Vacancy creation costs
represent one percent of output.
It must be noted that our baseline economy has been pinned down without targeting the
unemployment rate and the workers' job-¯nding rate. Yet, the values implied by the baseline
economy for these two variables are fairly close to U.S. average values. Thus, the steady-state
equilibrium yields an unemployment rate of 6:2% and a job-¯nding rate of 0:5, whereas U.S.
average values for the period 1951-2003 are 5:7% and 0:45, respectively.
Our baseline economy is presented in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Baseline Economy
E±ciency of matching M 0:64
Matching-unemployment elasticity ´ 0:6
Average job destruction rate ^ ¸ 0:034
Vacancy creation costs c 0:9
Parameter in adjustment cost function a1 180
Parameter in adjustment cost function a2 99
Workers' bargaining power ° 0:5
Elasticity of output w.r.t. capital ® 0:30
Depreciation rate of capital ± 0:011
Discount factor ¯ 0:995
Unemployment bene¯ts b 1
We close this section by con¯rming that our baseline economy satis¯es the condition for
optimality stated above. A log linearization around the unique, interior, steady-state equilibrium
yields real eigenvalues, two of them lying outside the unit circle, which is the condition for saddle-
path stability in our model economy.
123 Model Evaluation
In this section we review a number of labor market stylized facts and then assess the ability
of our model to account for these facts. Tables 2 and 3 below present a selection of business
cycle statistics which have guided most of the recent research in the macro labor literature.
Standard deviations and correlations reported in these two tables are taken from Shimer (2005)
and Horstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) and correspond to the cyclical components of logged
variables detrended with a Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter with smoothing parameter 105. Data consist
of quarterly observations for the U.S. economy from 1951 to 2003.
The most salient features of °uctuations in U.S. labor market variables are the large volatilities
of unemployment (u), vacancies (v), tightness (v=u) and the workers' job-¯nding rate (µ¹), relative
to the volatility of labor productivity (y=n). As shown in the second row of Table 2, unemployment
°uctuates 9:5 times more than labor productivity, vacancies °uctuate 10 times more; °uctuations
in labor market tightness are almost 20 times larger than those in productivity and the job-
¯nding rate °uctuates almost 12 times more than productivity. On the contrary, the volatility of
wages is close to the volatility in labor productivity. Another important feature of these data is
the low-to-moderate correlation between °uctuations in labor market variables and °uctuations
in labor productivity (see fourth row of Table 2). Unemployment is counter-cyclical with a
correlation coe±cient of ¡0:408. Vacancies, tightness and the job-¯nding rate are pro-cyclical,
with a coe±cient of correlation of about 0:4. Wages are also pro-cyclical with a correlation of
0:65. In terms of autocorrelation, all variables except wages have an autocorrelation coe±cient
of about 0:9. Wages have a ¯rst-order autocorrelation coe±cient of 0:78.
Table 2. 1951-2003 Quarterly U.S. Labor Market
u v v=u µ¹ ! y=n
Standard Deviation(%) 19:00 20:20 38:20 11:80 2:200 2:000
Std. Dev. relative to y=n 9:500 10:10 19:10 5:900 1:100 1
Auto-Correlation 0:936 0:940 0:941 0:908 0:781 0:878
Correlation with y=n ¡0:408 0:364 0:396 0:396 0:655 1
Notes. Standard Deviations and correlations in this table correspond to quarterly series, detrended
using a Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter with smoothing parameter 105, as calculated by Shimer (2005).
Cross correlations in °uctuations of labor market variables are presented in Table 3 below.
It is worth noting the strong negative correlation between °uctuations in unemployment and
vacancies of ¡0:89. This is the slope of the Beveridge curve.
13Table 3. 1951-2003 Quarterly U.S. Labor Market
u v v=u µ¹ y=n
u 1 ¡0:894 ¡0:971 ¡0:949 ¡0:408
v - 1 0:975 0:897 0:364
v=n - - 1 0:948 0:396
µ¹ - - - 1 0:396
y=n - - - - 1
Notes. Cross Correlations of detrended U.S. labor market variables.
3.1 Labor Market Volatility in the Baseline Economy
In order to assess the ability of the model to amplify and propagate shocks, we adopt a step-
by-step strategy and introduce each of the shocks separately. We ¯rst consider neutral technology
shocks, i.e. shocks that a®ect the production of the consumption and investment good equally.
Secondly, we study the response of labor market variables to investment-speci¯c shocks, i.e. to
shocks that a®ect only the production of the capital good. Finally, we combine these two shocks
along with shocks to the rate of job destruction.
3.1.1 Neutral Technology Shocks
The standard approach used to assess the volatility properties of the Mortensen-Pissarides
model consists in assuming a reduced-form, stochastic, exogenous process for labor productivity
and then deriving the implied °uctuations in unemployment, vacancies, tightness, the job-¯nding
rate and wages. In our extended version of the model, however, labor productivity is endogenous
to the ¯rm's investment and hiring policies. Therefore, the obvious counterpart for our model of
the above approach is to shock labor productivity |de¯ned as output (net of adjustment and
vacancy costs) per worker| by introducing neutral technology shocks, i.e., shocks to the technol-
ogy to produce the aggregate good. In this section, we carry out this exercise and calibrate the
neutral technology process by following the traditional approach of the business cycle literature.
As speci¯ed in equation (2:3), neutral technology, z, follows the law of motion,
lnz0 = ½z lnz + ²z; (3.1)
where ²z » N(0;¾²z). We set ¾²z equal to 0:0078 in order to match the quarterly standard
deviation of U.S. labor productivity of 2%. The persistence parameter, ½z, is set equal to 0:95. In
14this section, the level of investment-speci¯c technology and the rate of job separation are assumed
to remain constant at their average values.
Our results, presented in Tables 4 and 5 below, are in accordance with those found by Shimer
(2005) within the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model with small ¯rms (employer-worker pairs)
and no capital. Shocks to the level of technology in the production of the aggregate good fail to
generate enough ampli¯cation in labor market variables. Neutral technology shocks that generate
the observed volatility in labor productivity of 2% account for only 6% percent of the observed
volatility in unemployment; for less than 12% percent of the volatility in vacancies and for 9%
of the volatility in tightness. The second row of Table 4 shows the generated volatilities in labor
market variables relative to the volatility of labor productivity. (Relative volatilities are the
standard statistic reported in this literature to assess ampli¯cation.) Unemployment and the
job-¯nding rate °uctuate relatively less than productivity. Vacancies and labor market tightness
°uctuate only 1:23 and 1:81 times more than productivity, respectively. On the other hand, the
relative volatility of wages is slightly below that observed in U.S. data.
Shocks to neutral technology also fail to account for the moderate contemporaneous correlation
of labor market variables with labor productivity. In particular, labor market tightness in the
model is almost perfectly correlated with productivity, while this correlation is only 0:4 in the
data. The model has no propagation of neutral technology shocks.
The explanation for the model's limited ampli¯cation of neutral technology shocks is to be
found, as in the framework of Shimer (2005), in the high sensitivity of wages to these shocks. In
our baseline economy, the contemporaneous correlation between labor productivity and wages is
0:998 (see fourth row of Table 4). As formulated by Shimer (2005), the increase in wages after
a positive technology shock absorbs most of the productivity increase and therefore reduces the
incentive for vacancy creation. Hence, equilibrium unemployment, vacancies and the job-¯nding
rate do no respond much to neutral technology shocks.
Table 4. Baseline Economy with Neutral Technology Shocks
u v v=u µ¹ ! y=n
Standard Deviation(%) 1:307 2:478 3:634 1:450 1:929 2:000
Std. Dev. relative to y=n 0:653 1:239 1:815 0:725 0:964 1
Auto-Correlation 0:886 0:641 0:803 0:803 0:848 0:857
Correlation with y=n ¡0:940 0:899 0:952 0:952 0:998 1
Notes. Baseline economy with neutral technology shocks: Standard deviations and correlations in this
table correspond to detrended quarterly averages of the monthly generated series. A H-P ¯lter with
smoothing parameter 105 has been used to obtain the trend.
15As for cross correlations, the baseline economy succeeds at generating the strong correla-
tions between unemployment, vacancies, tightness and the job-¯nding rate observed in the U.S.
economy.
Table 5. Baseline Economy with Neutral Technology Shocks
u v v=u µ¹ y=n
u 1 ¡0:821 ¡0:920 ¡0:920 ¡0:940
v - 1 0:978 0:978 0:899
v=n - - 1 0:999 0:952
µ¹ - - - 1 0:952
y=n - - - - 1
Notes. Neutral Technology Shocks: Cross correlations of simulated variables.
We ¯nd it convenient to close this section by taking a further look at the high sensitivity of
wages to neutral technology shocks from the dynamics of the ¯rm's °ow value of employment [the
¯rst expression within the brackets of equation (2:14)] and of the worker's value of unemployment
[the second expression within the brackets of equation (2:14)]. Under symmetric Nash-bargaining
the wage is the average of these two values. Figure 1 below shows the gross °ow value of the
match for the ¯rm (upper series) and the worker's value of unemployment (lower series) when the
model is run for one thousand months. Cyclical components of these values are not only strongly
correlated (the correlation coe±cient is 0:9944) but show also a strong correlation with the level
of neutral technology (the correlation coe±cient between the ¯rm's °ow value of a match and z
is 0:9902; and the coe±cient for the workers' value of unemployment and z is 0:9982:)
3.1.2 Investment-speci¯c Technology Shocks
We now study business cycle °uctuations in labor market variables in the economy with
investment-speci¯c technology shocks and assess the ability of the model to generate ampli¯cation.
In this section, we shut down shocks to neutral technology and leave shocks to investment-speci¯c
technology as the only source of volatility. As explained above, the volatility and persistence of
the investment-speci¯c technology process can be estimated from the capital price series (see
Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (2000) and Fisher (2007) for details). Thus, unlike neutral
technology, whose volatility was set to match the observed volatility in labor productivity, the cal-
ibration of investment-speci¯c technology is guided by observed capital price series. Consequently,
the question addressed in this section is twofold. First, how much of the observed volatility in la-
bor productivity can be explained by shocks to investment-speci¯c technology? Second, do shocks
16to investment-speci¯c technology generate the observed ampli¯cation in labor market variables?
That is, does the model generate relative volatilities in unemployment, vacancies, tightness and
the job-¯nding rate as those observed in the U.S. economy?
The two parameters to be calibrated in the investment-speci¯c technology process,
lnq0 = ½q lnq + ²q; (3.2)
are the volatility of ²q and the persistence parameter ½q. The volatility of shocks to investment-
speci¯c technology, ¾²q, is set at 0:0095 in order to match the 2:6% quarterly standard deviation
of detrended capital prices of the U.S. economy. The baseline value for the persistence parameter
is set at 0:98. Capital prices show high persistence and we have carried out a sensitivity analysis
with respect to this parameter. Our results are robust to changes in this parameter.
The results of our exercise are shown in Tables 6 and 7 below. The answer to our ¯rst
question is in the ¯rst row of Table 6: investment-speci¯c technology shocks yield a volatility
in labor productivity of 0:8%, thus accounting for 40% of its empirical value. This number
agrees with the estimated contribution of investment-speci¯c shocks to output volatility found
by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (2000) and Fisher (2007). These authors use a standard
neoclassical model with a Walrasian labor market and ¯nd that shocks to investment-speci¯c
technology explain about one third of U.S. output volatility.
Our question concerning the extent of labor market volatility generated by shocks to investment-
speci¯c technology is also addressed in Table 6. The volatility of unemployment is 4:15%, which
amounts to 22% of the volatility observed in the U.S. economy. The volatility of vacancies is
8:09%, which is 40% of its observed value. As for labor market tightness and the job-¯nding rate,
generated volatilities represent 30% and 40% of the observed values, respectively. The second
row of Table 6 presents volatilities relative to the volatility of labor productivity. Relative volatil-
ities are close to the ones observed in U.S. data. For instance, vacancies in our model economy
°uctuate 10:05 times more than labor productivity and the job-¯nding rate °uctuates 5:79 times
more. In the U.S. economy these two numbers are 10:1 and 5:9, respectively. Unemployment in
the model °uctuates 5:15 times more than productivity, while this number is 9:5 in the U.S. econ-
omy. The relative volatility of labor market tightness is 14:4, against 19:1 in the data. Finally,
the model matches the observed relative volatility of wages of 1:1.
Correlations of unemployment, vacancies, tightness and the job-¯nding rate with labor pro-
ductivity are also in line with the ones observed in U.S. data. In the model, the contemporaneous
correlation coe±cient between unemployment and labor productivity is ¡0:42, against a ¡0:4
in the data. For the other three variables, the model yields coe±cients of around 0:48, against
correlations of around 0:4 in the data.
17Table 6. Baseline Economy with Investment-speci¯c Technology Shocks
u v v=u µ¹ ! y=n
Standard Deviation(%) 4:150 8:095 11:61 4:668 0:947 0:805
Std. Dev. relative to y=n 5:155 10:05 14:42 5:798 1:176 1
Auto-Correlation 0:854 0:564 0:754 0:753 0:767 0:978
Correlation with y=n ¡0:423 0:472 0:481 0:481 0:901 1
Notes. Baseline economy with investment-speci¯c technology shocks: Standard deviations and
correlations in this table correspond to detrended quarterly averages of the monthly generated series. A
H-P ¯lter with smoothing parameter 105 has been used to obtain the trend.
The explanation as to why investment-speci¯c technology shocks amplify the volatility of
labor market variables stems from adjustment costs and their impact on wages. We will make use
of the impulse-responses to a positive investment-speci¯c shock, shown in Figure 2, to explain our
results. Unlike shocks to neutral technology, investment-speci¯c shocks introduce a bias in favor
of capital by lowering its price. Hence, an increase in q yields an immediate sharp increase in
investment with a consequent increase in adjustment costs. In order to spread out these (convex)
costs over time, the ¯rm's optimal policy calls for a delay in the increase of hiring after the
increase in q. That is, the ¯rm ¯rst builds up the capital stock, taking advantage of its lower
price, and then increases employment. Indeed, both labor productivity and vacancies are hump-
shaped after an initial drop. These two variables show a prolonged increase before they start
decreasing to their steady-state values (see Figure 2). The delayed increase in hiring is fostered
by the dampening e®ect of q on wages. Intra-¯rm wage bargaining implies that the ¯rm shares
adjustment costs with the workers and thus, investment-speci¯c technology shocks do not create
a perfect correlation between labor productivity and wages (see fourth row of Table 6). Even
though this correlation coe±cient is higher than its empirical value, 0:9 against 0:65, it represents
a substantial decrease in the sensitivity of wages to labor productivity, as compared to the case
of neutral technology shocks. Therefore, unemployment and vacancies respond relatively more to
investment-speci¯c shocks than they do to neutral shocks.6
6It is worth noting that the initial jump in investment and the drop in productivity at the time of an increase
in investment-speci¯c technology are consistent with both plant level and aggregate observations. For instance,
Sakellaris (1994) uses data on U.S. manufacturing plants from the Annual Survey of Manufactures and studies plant
productivity after factor adjustments. He ¯nds that Total Factor Productivity falls in periods of investment spikes.
His hypothesis for this fall is that the investment spike involves the introduction in the plant of new technology
embodied in the installed equipment, which may be operated ine±ciently in the short run. In our model, the fall
in productivity is due to the increased costs of adjusting the new equipment. Hornstein and Krusell (1996) and
Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) argue that the mid-70's productivity slowdown was caused by the increase in
18Furthermore, the model also does fairly well in accounting for the observed cross correlations
between labor market variables. The slope of the Beveridge curve is slightly below the U.S. value.
The model yields a contemporaneous correlation coe±cient between unemployment and vacancies
of ¡0:77, against a ¡0:89 in the data.
Table 7. Baseline Economy with Investment-speci¯c Technology Shocks
u v v=u µ¹ y=n
u 1 ¡0:772 ¡0:896 ¡0:895 ¡0:423
v - 1 0:974 0:974 0:472
v=n - - 1 0:999 0:481
µ¹ - - - 1 0:481
y=n - - - - 1
Notes. Investment-speci¯c technology shocks: Cross correlations of simulated variables.
We close this section by showing the dynamics of the ¯rm's and workers' values determining the
wage (see Figure 3 below). Unlike the case of neutral technology shocks, the cyclical components
of these two values are not perfectly correlated (the correlation coe±cient is 0:6375). Moreover,
the correlation of the cyclical component of each of these values with the level of investment-
speci¯c technology is also substantially lower than under neutral-technology shocks. Thus, the
correlation coe±cient between the ¯rm's °ow value of a match and q is 0:4696 and between the
worker's value of unemployment and q is only ¡0:1727. This latter value implies a low feedback
from the value of unemployment to the current wage, contrary to what we observe in the economy
with neutral-technology shocks.
3.1.3 Shocks to Neutral, Investment-speci¯c Technology and Job Separation
In this section we study labor market dynamics in the economy with three sources of volatility:
two technology shocks |neutral and investment-speci¯c| and shocks to the rate of job separa-
tion, ¸. Fluctuations in job separation in the U.S. economy are large and their contribution to
labor market volatility has been widely acknowledged in the literature. Fujita and Ramey (2008)
estimate that contemporaneous °uctuations in the separation rate explain an important fraction
of °uctuations in U.S. unemployment.
investment-speci¯c technology of the mid 70's. They point to adoption and learning as the main mechanisms for
the productivity slowdown.
19The exercise we carry out in this section proceeds as follows. The exogenous process for job
separation, which we rewrite here for convenience, is,
ln¸0 = (1 ¡ ½¸)ln ^ ¸ + ½¸ ln¸ + ²¸; (3.3)
where ²¸ » N(0;¾²¸). This is the process used by Ramey (2008) in Section 2.2 of his paper.
First, we calibrate the two parameters ½¸ and ¾²¸ in the job separation process so that we match
the persistence and volatility of job separation in the 1951-2003 U.S. economy. For this period,
the cyclical component of job separation yields a ¯rst-order autocorrelation coe±cient of 0:733,
and a volatility of 7:5% [see Shimer (2005)]. As for the investment-speci¯c technology process
we use the same calibration as in the previous subsection. Finally, we recalibrate the volatility
of the neutral technology shock so that the standard deviation of labor productivity equals 2%
in the model economy. That is, while the volatilities of the innovations to ¸ and q are set to
match the observed volatilities in job separation and in capital prices, respectively, the volatility
of innovations to z is chosen as the residual to match the volatility of U.S. labor productivity.
Following this procedure, the values obtained for ½¸, ¾²¸ and ¾²z are 0:85, 0:043 and 0:007,
respectively.
Tables 8 and 9 present volatilities and correlations of labor market variables in our baseline
economy with two technology shocks and a job separation shock. As shown in the ¯rst row
of Table 8, the model explains a substantial fraction of observed labor market volatility. In
particular, the model accounts for 43% of the observed volatility in unemployment, 78% of the
volatility in vacancies, 45% of the volatility in tightness and 61% of the volatility in the job-¯nding
rate. The volatility of wages in the model is 97% of its empirical value. The model also accounts
for the mild correlation between labor productivity and unemployment, vacancies, tightness and
the job-¯nding rate.
Table 8. Baseline Economy with Three Sources of Volatility
u v v=u µ¹ ! y=n
Standard Deviation(%) 8:100 15:795 16:912 7:281 2:136 2:000
Std. Dev. relative to y=n 4:050 7:897 8:456 3:640 1:068 1
Auto-Correlation 0:764 0:346 0:536 0:519 0:654 0:874
Correlation with y=n ¡0:302 0:284 0:401 0:391 0:890 1
Notes. Baseline economy with two technology shocks and a job separation shock: Standard deviations
and correlations in this table correspond to detrended quarterly averages of the monthly generated series.
A H-P ¯lter with smoothing parameter 105 has been used to obtain the trend.
20Cross correlations are presented in Table 9. As already shown by many authors |e.g. Cole
and Rogerson (1999), Shimer (2005) and Ramey (2008)| shocks to the exogenous rate of job
separation generate a counterfactual upward-sloping Beveridge curve. In our model economy this
slope is 0:172. It should be noted that the positive unemployment-vacancy correlation is not a
result speci¯c to our model nor to the assumption of exogenous separation. Ramey (2008) solves
a version of the search-and-matching model with small ¯rms and shocks to the exogenous rate
of job separation and obtains a correlation between unemployment and vacancies of 0:75. In a
speci¯cation of his model with endogenous separation the value for this correlation is as high as
0:92.
Table 9. Baseline Economy with Three Sources of Volatility
u v v=u µ¹ y=n
u 1 0:172 ¡0:332 ¡0:304 ¡0:302
v - 1 0:879 0:880 0:284
v=n - - 1 0:991 0:401
µ¹ - - - 1 0:391
y=n - - - - 1
Notes. Baseline economy with two technology shocks and a job separation shock: Cross correlations of
simulated variables.
In light of the results in this paper and in some recent papers in this literature, it may
be said that the puzzle on labor market °uctuations is more about correlations than about
volatilities. In other words, the question is not so much whether the search-and-matching model
generates ampli¯cation in labor market variables as whether it generates ampli¯cation with the
right correlations. A better understanding of the °ow into unemployment seems to be crucial to
answer this latter question.
3.2 The Response of Unemployment to Labor Market Policy
We now turn to the sensitivity of unemployment with respect to unemployment bene¯ts. As
pointed out recently by Costain and Reiter (2008), the unemployment puzzle is not only about
volatilities but also about the sensitivity of unemployment to policy, particularly to unemployment
bene¯ts. Besides citing a large body of empirical studies aimed at estimating this sensitivity, these
authors also conduct their own estimation using low-frequency cross-country data from 1960 to
1999. They ¯nd that the long-run semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to bene¯ts ranges
21from 1.33 to 2.45, depending upon whether controls for country or time e®ects are included or
not.





u, is equal to 1.1. This number is in the lower bound of empirical estimates,
implying that in our calibration there is still room to increase unemployment bene¯ts, which
will allow us to generate even more volatility in labor market variables with investment-speci¯c
technology shocks, without creating an excessive sensitivity of unemployment to bene¯ts.
4 Conclusions
In the vast majority of the literature on search-and-matching models of the labor market,
production takes place in small ¯rms (employer-worker pairs) |the Mortensen-Pissarides model7.
The productivity of the worker is assumed to follow an exogenous process and capital is typically
left out of the analysis. We depart from this framework by assuming large ¯rms, which invest in
capital, create vacancies to hire new workers and pay adjustment costs. We assume that wages
are the outcome of a Nash-bargaining problem between the ¯rm and the workers. Our main focus
is on the business-cycle °uctuations of labor market variables. To this aim, we assume that the
levels of neutral and investment-speci¯c technologies are subject to shocks. A key feature of our
model is that investment and hiring rates interact in the determination of total adjustment costs.
Empirical support for this interaction has been recently o®ered by Merz and Yashiv (2007) using
U.S. data.
While neutral technology shocks have only a small impact on labor market variables, shocks
to investment-speci¯c technology generate sizable °uctuations in unemployment, vacancies, labor
market tightness and the worker's job ¯nding rate. In our economy, °uctuations in labor market
variables are not associated with an implausible elasticity of unemployment to unemployment
bene¯ts.
By bringing the neoclassical ¯rm to the center stage of the search-and-matching model, we
show that volatility in labor market variables can be ampli¯ed without abandoning the assumption
of continuous Nash-wage bargaining. Even though the model we explored in this paper is rather
stylized, it allows us to gain new insights on the e®ect of investment-speci¯c technology shocks
on labor market volatility. There are, however, many dimensions along which the model can be
extended and improved. The model, like many others in the literature, fails to account for the
strong, negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies over the business cycle when
job separation is non-constant.
7See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000).
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255 Appendix
Proof of the Proposition: Equation (2:14) is a linear, ¯rst-order di®erential equation and its
solution can be found analytically. Since the worker's outside value is independent of the ¯rm's





Fn ¡ !n(v;i;s;S)n ¡ Hn(v;i;s;S)
i
; (5.1)
then, ! = ^ ! + 1
2
h
b + µ¹¯E ^ W0
i
is the general solution to (2:14).











Therefore, ^ ! is the solution to (5:2) if and only if,
^ !ne
R
































Multiplying through by dn and integrating, we get,















where Ã is a constant of integration. For our parameterized economy, the integral in the last term
of (5:5) can be solved. First, e
R
(2=n)dn = e2ln(n) = n2. Then, using the functional forms speci¯ed







































After plugging the last two expressions back into (5:5) we obtain ^ !. Finally, adding the worker's
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Figure 1: Figure 1 plots the ¯rm's °ow value of a match (upper series) and the worker's value of
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Figure 2: Top chart of Figure 2 plots the response of labor productivity (broken line) to a
positive shock to investment-speci¯c technology (solid line). Bottom chart plots the response of
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Figure 3: Figure 3 plots the ¯rm's °ow value of a match (upper series) and the worker's value of
unemployment in our baseline economy under investment-speci¯c technology shocks.
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